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Synopsis
China’s rise to prosperity has seen increased tension with international standards of human rights and the rule
of law such that, after a lengthy period of tentative engagement China has more recently worked to change
international standards to accommodate its interests. China’s approach to human rights and the rule of law has
significant implications for Canada, not only for our bilateral relations but also in terms of the impacts on
international institutions that are of vital interest to Canada. In response, Canada should pursue a program of
selective engagement, that combines attention to China’s abuses of human rights and the rule of law with
continuing engagement on issues of bilateral and global concern.
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China’s respect for human rights and the rule of law is
indispensable from a constructive diplomatic relationship
with Canada because it affects a wide range of CanadaChina bilateral diplomatic, commercial, and socio-cultural
interactions. As a middle power, Canada has a significant
stake in international institutions and standards whose
effectiveness depends on China’s commitment to human
rights.
PRC Approaches to Human Rights and Rule of Law
The People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) holds to a human
rights orthodoxy of Regime-Led Development1. Consistent
with earlier official statements dating back to the 1989
Tiananmen Crisis, China’s 2019 human rights white paper
held:
“The rights to subsistence and development are the
primary rights ... The effective guarantee of the right to
subsistence and the steady improvement of living standards
are the preconditions and foundations for fulfilling and
developing all other human rights.” 2
The orthodoxy of Regime-Led Development is bolstered in
turn by precepts requiring the supremacy of the ruling
Communist Party of China (“CPC”), the conditionality of
rights, and the developmental stability. First, the CPC
exercises unfettered control over all institutions and
processes of PRC governance.3 CPC control extends to
China’s “socialist legal system,” which uses legal
terminology to articulate and enforce the orders of the
Party-state.4
Despite efforts under SPC President Xiao Yang (1998–
2008) to strengthen their professionalism and autonomy,
judges remain subject to ever-stricter CPC oversight.5
1

Indeed, the PRC Supreme People’s Court itself was
chastised earlier this year for unsatisfactory
“implementation of the Party’s line, direction, and policies
and the Party’s central decision making and deployment.”6
Lawyers too are subject to Party control under the PRC
Lawyers Law and the All-China Lawyers Association’s
“Lawyers Code of Conduct.”7 Under Xi Jinping, the
precept of Party Supremacy has been entrenched more
insistently in PRC legal institutions where human rights
are most often advanced and decided.8 Party dominance
over human rights was explained in China’s 2019 human
rights White Paper, which averred, “the Party’s leadership
is the fundamental guarantee for the people of China to
have access to human rights, and to fully enjoy more
human rights.”9
Supporting the precept of Party Supremacy, China’s
human rights orthodoxy holds that all rights remain
conditional on loyalty to the Party-state. The PRC
constitution provides “every citizen enjoys the rights and
at the same time must perform the duties prescribed by
the Constitution and the law” and that the exercise of
constitutional rights “may not infringe upon the interests
of the state, of society or of the collective, or upon the
lawful freedoms and rights of other citizens.”10 Thus,
constitutional rights in freedoms of expression, the press,
assembly and association, demonstration, religious belief,
and more depend on submission to the authority of the
Party-state. The orthodoxy of Regime-Led Development
also relies on a precept that maintaining stability is
fundamental to PRC law and governance.11 China’s
various human rights white papers and action plans hold
consistently that stability is essential for China’s
development and hence is an essential objective of China’s
law and practice on human rights and the rule of law.12

See Pitman B. Potter, Exporting Virtue? China’s International Human Rights Activism in the Age of Xi Jinping (Vancouver: forthcoming UBC Press, 2020), from which parts of this essay are adapted.
Council Information Office (“SCIO”), “Seeking Happiness for People: 70 Years of Progress on Human Rights in China,” http://english.scio.gov.cn/node_8014390.html, Section II. Also see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of

2 State

the People’s Republic of China (“MFA”), “China and the United Nations: Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China for the 74th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” September 18, 2019,
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t1698812.shtml, Section VIII, which sums up China’s human rights philosophy as “giving top priority to development.”
3 See

generally Stein Ringen, The Perfect Dictatorship: China in the 21st Century (Hong Kong: HKU Press, 2016).
Creemers, “Party Ideology and Chinese Law,” SSRN, July 9, 2018, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3210541; Susan Trevaskes, “China’s Party-Led Rule-of-Law Regime,” East Asia Forum, October 2, 2017, http://
www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/10/02/chinas-party-led-rule-of-law-regime/.
5 “Regulation on the Communist Party of China’s Political-Legal Work,” China Law Translate, January 18, 2019, https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/regulation-on-the-communist-party-of-chinas-political-legal-work/.
6 “Central Inspection Group Gives Feedback to the Supreme People’s Court (2020 edition),” Supreme People’s Court Monitor, January 12, 2020, https://supremepeoplescourtmonitor.com/2020/01/12/central-inspectiongroup-gives-feedback-to-the-supreme-peoples-court-2020-edition/.

4 Rogier

7 “Zhonghua
8 Chen

renmin gongheguo lüshi fa” [Lawyers Law of the PRC], rev. October 28, 2007, Article 3, https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/prc-lawyers-law-2007-revision-chinese-text; “Lawyers Practice Code
of Conduct (Draft Revisions),” China Law Translate, June 18, 2014, http://www.chinalawtranslate.com/lawyers-practice-code-of-conduct-draft-revisions/?lang=en.

Yujie, 2019 Nian Sifa Renquan Guancha [Survey on human rights in the (PRC) administration of Justice], Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, http://www.tfd.org.tw/opencms/chinese/publication/human/.
SCIO, “Seeking Happiness for People,” Section I.

“Constitution of the PRC,” rev. 2004, Articles 33, 51, https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/constitution-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china.
10 Sarah Biddulph, The Stability Imperative: Human Rights and Law in China (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016).
SCIO, “Seeking Happiness for People,” Section I.
9

11

“Constitution of the PRC,” rev. 2004, Articles 33, 51, https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/constitution-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china. Sarah Biddulph, The Stability Imperative: Human Rights and Law in
China (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016).

12 SCIO,

“National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2012–2015)”; SCIO, “Progress in China’s Human Rights in 2014,” Section III; SCIO, “New Progress in the Judicial Protection of Human Rights in China,” September
12, 2016, Section III; SCIO, “New Progress in the Legal Protection of Human Rights in China,” December 15, 2017, Section V; http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/32832/Document/1613604/1613604.htm; http://
www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7241418.htm; “Rule of Law Strengthens Social Stability in New Era: Editorial,” China Daily, March 12, 2019, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201903/12/
WS5c87a4faa3106c65c34ee3b0.html.
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In light of China’s human rights orthodoxy and its
attendant precepts, few find it surprising that China’s
record on human rights and the rule of law leaves much to
be desired. Abuses in Xi Jinping’s China have been well
documented in areas such as censorship, the torture of
prisoners, extensive use of the death penalty, suppression
of religious freedoms, abuse of ethnic minorities (including
but not limited to the incarceration of some 1.5 million of
Xinjiang’s Uighur Muslims and some half million Tibetans
in forced labour camps”13), denial of LGBTQ rights, use of
surveillance technology, and the persecution of Chinese
lawyers and legal scholars to name a few14. Such abuses
present a challenge for Canada’s bilateral relations with
China.
China’s International Activism
China has worked assiduously to insulate its preferred
approach to human rights and the rule of law from the
reach of international standards while also working to
revise those standards to suit PRC orthodoxy.15 For many
years, China’s approach to international human rights
standards followed a well-worn path of tentative
acceptance coupled with references to local conditions as
grounds for delays in implementation. While China
remains bound by numerous international human rights
treaties it has either signed or ratified,16 in recent years the
Xi regime has endeavored more intently to amend
international standards to conform to its own
preferences.17 Through its membership on the UN Human
Rights Council (“UNHRC”), China has worked to entrench
its human rights orthodoxy as an alternative to exiting
rules.18 China’s response to the 2018 UNHRC Universal
Periodic Review (“UPR”) asserted the validity of human
rights with Chinese characteristics, underscoring yet
further Beijing’s resistance to international standards.

China has also worked to challenge international
standards on the rule of law. Despite direct conflicts with
the consensus norms of the UN Delivering Justice
Programme that the rule of law should apply equally to
both government and society,20 China has defended its
CPC-dominated legal system as a legitimate alternative.
For example, China’s 2016 UN position paper claimed, “at
the national level, countries are entitled to independently
choose the mode of rule of law that suits their national
conditions.”21 China’s 2019 position paper reiterated that
the rule of law should be subject to China’s specific
national conditions.22 Thus, like its efforts with
international human rights rules, Xi Jinping’s China has
attempted to insulate its authoritarian legal regime from
the reach of international standards on rule of law - either
by claiming exceptionalism or by seeking to change the
standards themselves.
Implications for Canada
Canada has enjoyed a long and mutually beneficial
relationship with China. From the earliest days of the
Pacific Princess delivering mail in 1889, to the opening of
Sun Life’s China office 1893 and the establishment of the
Canadian Department of Trade and Commerce office in
Shanghai in 1909, Canada has pursued commercial
opportunities with counterparts in China for well over a
century. In the early and middle years of the 20th century,
missionary-led education efforts in China, and
immigration and head tax reforms in Canada, laid a
foundation for people-to-people exchanges. The allimportant wheat sales beginning in 1961, alleviated
China’s post–Great Leap Forward famine and signalled
Canada’s commitment to compassionate development
aid. Formal diplomatic relations beginning in 1970 laid
the foundation for the removal of Cold War barriers and
the re-entry of the PRC into the world

13 Lindsay

Maizland, “China’s Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang,” backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations, November 25, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-crackdown-uighurs-xinjiang; Helen Davidson,
“Report charts China’s expansion of mass labour programme in Tibet,” The Guardian, September 22, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/22/report-charts-chinas-expansion-of-mass-labourprogramme-in-tibet.
14 Congressional-Executive Commission on China (“CECC”), 2019 Annual Report (Washington, DC: US Government Publishing Office, 2019), https://www.cecc.gov/publications/annualreports/2019-annual-report; Human Rights Watch (“HRW”), “China: Events of 2019,” https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/china-and-tibet.
15 HRW,

“China’s Global Threat to Human Rights,” 2019, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/global.
of Minnesota Human Rights Library, “Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties – China,” http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/research/ratification-china.html. For example, China has ratified or

16 University

acceded to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”), the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“ICERD”), the convention against slavery, and the anti-torture convention. China has not ratified the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), but as a signatory is bound under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (1155 UNTS 331, entered into force January 27, 1980, https://
treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf) “to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose” of the covenant pending ratification.
Yu-jie Chen, “China’s Challenge to the International Human Rights Regime,” New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 51 (2019), pp. 1179–1222, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3308205.
Sceats and Shaun Breslin, “China and the International Human Rights System,” Chatham House, October 1, 2012, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/186781.
19 UNHRC, “National Report Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 16/21: China,” October 1, 2018, A/HRC/WG.6/31/CHN/1*, Section I.C, https://www.uprinfo.org/sites/default/files/document/china/session_31_-_november_2018/a_hrc_wg.6_31_chn_1_e.pdf.
17

18 Sonya

UNGA, “Delivering Justice: Programme of Action to Strengthen the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels: Report of the Secretary-General,” March 16, 2012, A/66/749, http://archive.ipu.org/splz-e/
unbrief12/sg-report.pdf.
“Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China at the 71st Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” September 7, 2016, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t1395489.shtml.
22 MFA, “China and the United Nations: Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China for the 74th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” September 18, 2019, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/
wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t1698812.shtml, Section VIII.
20

21 MFA,
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23 See

political economy. Human rights and the rule of law have
played an important role in each of these efforts,
influencing program objectives and operational terms for
commercial links, community ties, development aid, and
diplomatic relations.

refugees (particularly from Hong Kong after China’s
recent enactment of a draconian and far-reaching security
law). Perhaps most importantly, Canadians with family
members in China suffer from the denial of human rights
to their loved ones.

Aside from its significance for the lives and wellbeing of the
Chinese people, the PRC’s approach to human rights and
the rule of law has important implications for Canada
today. Recalling that human rights and the rule of law
affect not only political discourse but virtually all aspects of
socio-economic life, ranging from trade and investment to
business regulation, environmental protection, labour
relations, immigration and travel, public health, housing,
and many others, China’s performance has widespread
impacts for Canadians with activities and interests there.
China’s disregard of international legal standards on
human rights and the rule of law undercuts the activities of
Canadian businesses, media organizations, and NGOs in
China on a wide array of issues involving contract and
property rights (including discrimination against foreign
firms, intellectual property theft, and corruption),
personnel (including limits on the hiring of international
and local staff), operations (including inconsistent
licensing and approvals), travel (especially restrictions on
travel to minority areas, such as Hong Kong and Taiwan),
and communications (notably internet restrictions and
surveillance).23 As well, Canadian government initiatives
and activities are constrained by uncertainties over China’s
performance of treaty standards on consular relations
(particularly regarding support for Canadians detained in
China), immigration and nationality controls (notably
concerning China’s treatment of Canadians who renounce
their PRC citizenship), surveillance and security
(particularly regarding protection of Canadians with
personal, professional, and academic ties to China), and

Multilaterally, China’s efforts to undermine universal
standards for human rights and the rule of law challenge
Canada’s efforts to promote a rules-based international
order.24 Predictable and enforceable standards are
essential to international relations – especially when there
is disagreement (as there often is) over the
implementation and global impacts of particular policy
decisions and initiatives. China’s refusal to accept the
award of the international South China Sea arbitration, its
resistance to international environmental and labour
standards, and its continued detention and forced labour
of Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang are but a few examples of
China’s disregard for international human rights
standards and the rule of law.25 Such disregard informs
PRC conditions for participation in multilateral
initiatives. The content and operation of international
efforts on peace keeping, sustainable development, and
global governance depend increasingly on their
compatibility with China’s preferences on human rights
and rule of law.26 While buy-in from individual states is
generally part and parcel of multilateral programs,
China’s political clout and economic weight militate
against the success of international initiatives deemed
inconsistent with PRC orthodoxy on human rights and
the rule of law.
Bilaterally, the Meng Wanzhou matter revealed the costs
China’s disregard for human rights have on Canada.27
Even while raising human rights concerns over Canada’s
arrest in December 2018 of the Huawei executive
following an extradition treaty request from the United

e.g., Global Affairs Canada, “Travel Advisories – China,” August 28, 2020, https://travel.gc.ca/destinations/china/.
Affairs Canada, “Plans at a glance and operating context,” June 6, 2019, https://www.international.gc.ca/gac-amc/priorities-priorites.aspx?lang=eng.
Text of Statement of China’s Foreign Ministry on Award of South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Philippines,” China Daily, July 12, 2016, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2016scsi/2016-07/12/
content_26062029.htm; Bo Zhang and Cong Cao, “Policy: Four Gaps in China’s New Environmental Law,” Nature, January 21, 2015, http://www.nature.com/news/policy-four-gaps-in-china-s-newenvironmental-law-1.16736; China-Country Baselines under the ILO Declaration (2000-2018), July 22, 2020, https://www.ilo.org/declaration/follow-up/annualreview/countrybaselines/WCMS_751606/lang-en/index.htm; “Canada among Countries Urging China to Shut Uighur Detention Camps,” CBC News, November 6, 2018, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/china-uighur-detention-camps-canada-westerncountries-1.4893676.

24 Global
25 Full

26

Christine Lee, “It’s Not Just the WHO: How China is Moving on the Whole U.N.,” Politico, April 15, 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/04/15/its-not-just-the-who-how-china-is-moving-on-the-wholeun-189029; Deborah Lehr, “Is China Still the Global Leader on Climate Change?,” The Diplomat, October 21, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/10/is-china-still-the-global-leader-on-climate-change/.

27

Canadian Press, “A timeline of events in the case of Meng Wanzhou,” National Post, June 19, 2020; “Huawei Arrest: What’s Happening between Canada and China?,” CBC News, January 29, 2019, https://www.cbc.ca
/news/world/huawei-meng-timeline-1.4989139.
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States, China’s behavior confirmed its narrow commitment
to the rule of law. Whereas in Canada, Meng has had full
access to PRC consular officials and was released on bail
after a public judicial hearing at which she was represented
by counsel, in China Canadians Michael Kovrig and
Michael Spavor were detained on vague national security
grounds without meaningful access to Canadian consular
officials or legal counsel and were subjected to harsh
treatment, all in defiance of bilateral agreements and
international human rights treaties. China’s decision to cut
off imports of canola to encourage Canada to “correct the
mistakes it made earlier” signalled disregard for the
international trade law in furtherance of Beijing’s political
goals.28 Indeed, concern over China’s efforts to
subordinate trade relations to its political agendas despite
WTO standards to the contrary, seems to have contributed
to Canada’s decision to discontinue talks over a possible
free trade agreement.29

climate change, pandemic responses, and bilateral issues
such as disability rights, sustainable design, narcotics
control, and money laundering.33 Discarding the
suggestion that raising concerns about human rights and
the rule of law will simply anger China and lead to
unproductive outcomes, selective engagement would
enable Canada to challenge China’s abuses through
international, regional, and local institutions and
communities even while pursuing cooperation on specific
bilateral and multilateral initiatives. And rather than
giving in to the temptation to see China as hopelessly
incalcitrant and incapable of responsible conduct barring
significant regime reform – even regime change,34
selective engagement would encourage cooperation with
the PRC Party-state on issues of mutual concern while
also promoting collaboration with like-minded actors in
China and elsewhere to counter abuse of international
human-rights and rule-of-law standards.

Ways Forward

Selective engagement offers a useful alternative to
relational discourses that either subordinate frank
discussion on China’s abuses of human rights and rule of
law to the broad imperative of maintaining friendly
relations or else reject the possibility of positive relations
altogether. Canada should reserve its relational
commitments for friends and allies who share our
commitment to human rights and the rule of law, whereas
for China a situational approach seems more sensible.
Canada would be well served by cooperating with a range
of global, regional, and local actors to encourage
performance of existing international human-rights and
rule-of-law standards, resist China’s revisionist efforts,
and hold China accountable for derogation while also
building on opportunities for agreement and cooperation
on global and bilateral issues of mutual interest. The
government of Canada has a special responsibility in this
regard since individual firms and organizations, while

Setting aside PRC efforts to enlist local commentators to
advance PRC policy preferences,30 Canadian responses to
China’s parochialism on human rights and the rule of law
tend to vary along a spectrum of alternatives. At one end, is
an accommodationist position that suggests that China is
large, powerful, and essential to Canada and that the best
approach is simply to avoid antagonizing China despite its
problems.31 At the other end, are activist critics, often with
direct experience of China’s human rights abuses, who are
less willing to accommodate China until it mends its
ways.32 A viable middle-ground alternative would rely on
the time-honoured strategic option of “selective
engagement” to enable focused challenges to China’s
abuses of human rights and the rule of law even while
pursuing cooperation on matters of mutual interest such as
global initiatives on
28

Associated Press, “China Urges Canada to ‘Correct the Mistakes It Made Earlier’ as Canola Spat Deepens,” CBC News, March 27, 2019, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/china-canola-crackdown-1.5073234?
fbclid=IwAR1lxycKg1qvSJ8zpu8tfG5WKm8COeHtA7y__dI-DCRof4V5sCXV8wiDn5A.

29 Nathan
30 Robert

Vanderklippe, “Canada abandons free-trade talks with China in shift for Trudeau government,” The Globe and Mail, September 17, 2020, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-canada-abandons-freetrade-talks-with-china-in-shift-for-trudeau/.

Fife and Stephen Chase, “Inside Huawei’s campaign to influence Canadian public opinion,” The Globe and Mail, September 16, 2020, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-inside-huaweis-campaignto-influence-canadian-public-opinion/.

31 Stephen

32 Rupa

Chase and Robert Fife, “More than 100 ex-diplomats urge Trudeau to swap Meng for Kovrig and Spavor, The Globe and Mail, September 18, 2020, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-morethan-100-ex-diplomats-urge-trudeau-to-swap-meng-for-kovrig-and/; John Paul Tasker and Brennan MacDonald, “Former parliamentarians, diplomats pen letter calling on Canada to release Meng,” CBC
News, June 24, 2020, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/letter-release-meng-1.5625669.

Shenoy, “Canadian activists say they’re being targeted by China,” The World, May 19, 2020, https://www.pri.org/stories/2020-05-19/canadian-activists-say-they-re-being-targeted-china; Amnesty International,
“Human rights defenders increasingly face threats intimidation over China advocacy: report,” March 2020.

33 “Canada
34 Gordon

Must Toughen Stance With China, Ex-Diplomats Say,” US News and World Report, June 23, 2020, https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2020-06-23/canadas-trudeau-must-toughen-stance-withchina-ex-diplomats-say.

G. Chang, “Mike Pompeo Just Declared America’s New China Policy: Regine Change,” The National Interest, July 25, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/mike-pompeo-just-declared-america’s-new-chinapolicy-regime-change-165639.
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already attaching to their program and budgeting
considerations a “China premium” reflecting the costs of
China’s disregard for international standards on human
rights and the rule of law, are otherwise unable to address
these issues directly due to China’s political influence and
economic weight.
Mindful of the perception that inaction in the face of
abuses of international human-rights and rule-of-law
standards connotes complicity, Canada can pursue a
number of useful steps in response to PRC behaviour.
Canada should work through the UN Development
Programme (“UNDP”), the Organization for Economic
Development and Cooperation (“OECD”), and the G20
while also supporting private diplomacy through Track
Two initiatives to encourage China to affirm the
importance of existing international human-rights and
rule-of-law standards and promote their enforcement. As
well, Canada should continue to pursue cooperation with
human-rights advocates internationally and within China
to encourage performance of international standards.
Canada should support inclusion of independent NGO
audits of China’s performance on human rights and rule of
law in the formal reporting by the UNHRC’s Universal
Periodic Review (UPR) processes as a foundation for
holding China accountable for violations of international
standards. Finally, measured application of Magnitsky
sanctions against PRC officials and business executives
responsible for or complicit in gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights would be
appropriate in response to local abuses. Such measures
need not undermine but rather should complement
continuing efforts to cooperate with China on matters of
mutual concern. Just as global business communities
increasingly recognize that improving China’s performance
of international human-rights and rule-of-law standards is
good for business, so too have policy actors in China
recognized that China’s performance of those standards is
important for the PRC’s expanding global influence.
Selective engagement would enable Canada to combine

positive engagement on issues of mutual interest with
critical engagement on human rights and the rule of law.
At the core this approach is a recognition that,
suggestions to the contrary notwithstanding, China needs
the support of Canada and the international community
to fulfill its goals of development and prosperity. The
general transition in PRC foreign policy from pursuit of
ideological ambition toward interest-based pragmatism
permits China to pursue matters of mutual concern with
Canada even while being called to task for human-rights
and rule-of-law abuses. Indeed, China’s efforts to alter
international human-rights and rule-of-law standards
tend to confirm its need for international approval – an
isolationist China would hardly be expected to devote
such efforts to changing the terms of international norms
and institutions. Commercially, Chinese firms do
business with Canada not because of an abstract fondness
for the land of Norman Bethune, but because it is in their
interest to do so. Despite the increased role of PRC stateowned and state-run enterprises, interest-based
commercial decision-making by Chinese firms seems
unlikely to be swayed much by Beijing’s political goals.
Despite Beijing’s posturing to the contrary, Canada would
do well to conduct its China relations from a position of
confidence – in our value to China as a trade partner and
an emblem of international legitimacy and acceptance, in
the value of our commitment to human rights and rule of
law for Canada’s influence in China and globally, and in
China’s pragmatic willingness to seek agreement on
matters of mutual interest despite criticism of its practices
on human rights and the rule of law. As we celebrate fifty
years of formal diplomatic ties, Canada has an
opportunity to enrich our association with China through
selective engagement on human rights and the rule of law.
The importance of the Canada-China relationship
requires no less.
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